FOUNDATIONAL SCIENTIFIC STATEMENT

Foundational Architecture of Psychological Functioning

A nonlinguistic, recurrent, embodied-relational, action-updating, and motivational framework

Version 2.2 | July 2026

> **DOCUMENT FUNCTION** This document records only the currently adopted foundational architecture. It does not attempt to provide a complete theory of mind, personality, psychopathology, neurological implementation, or treatment.

Supersedes Version 2.0 while retaining its fifteen-proposition architecture. Deep Orientation of the Psychological System, Version 2.2, provides the detailed companion elaboration; Continuous Inferential Flow in the Psychological System, Version 1.2, provides the mechanism-level clarification of recurrent relational updating; and Foundational Architecture of Psychological Defence, Version 1.5, develops the downstream defence model whose boundary distinctions are incorporated here.

1. Purpose and Scope

This document states a limited set of foundational propositions intended to describe a basic architecture of psychological functioning. It begins with bounded processes of regulation, learning, expectation, selection, and action that can operate without online words or sentences. It then states the framework's proposed integrations concerning dynamic self–world–future orientation, background organization, and the direction from preservation toward enrichment.

The base-level component processes described here are **nonlinguistic** in the precise sense that their online operation does not require words, sentences, explicit propositions, inner speech, or narrative identity. Their results may nevertheless shape or enter conscious experience and, where reflectively accessed, humans may later render them into language. Once available, language, narrative, and communication can themselves become new information for subsequent processing.

The bounded component processes adopted here are biologically implemented and can operate without online language. The functional propositions are intended, in principle, to apply to nonhuman organisms wherever the relevant forms of perception, regulation, learning, selection, and action are present. This does not establish that the exact integrated architecture is innate or that any particular organism is sentient.

Nonlinguistic operation does not by itself establish innateness. Biologically implemented, observed before conventional language, present at birth, developmentally emerging, experience-dependent, and genetically specified are different claims. Evidence supports bounded regulatory, learning, expectation, and action-related processes that operate without online language; it does not establish that the exact architecture proposed in this document is one innate process, fully formed at birth, developmentally fixed, or independent of prenatal experience, later learning, relationship, language, and culture. Prenatal learning and experience-induced expectations in infancy make this distinction especially important (DeCasper & Spence, 1986; Emberson, Richards, & Aslin, 2015; Mameli & Bateson, 2006; Partanen et al., 2013).

The framework does not determine which organisms are sentient. Criteria for attributing sentience are independent of, and outside the scope of, this framework. Where sentience is not independently warranted, the document makes only functional and regulatory claims. Phenomenal terms—including felt background state or better phenomenal experience—apply only where phenomenal experience is independently warranted.

"The system" is a functional description of the organism, not a second subject, homunculus, moral judge, or unitary inner executive. Likewise, functional integration does not imply one neural module, circuit, algorithm, or indivisible biological process. The architecture is deliberately neutral among

predictive-processing, active-inference, reinforcement-learning, ecological, enactive, dynamical, and other implementation frameworks. Terms such as inference, estimate, orientation, and updating are used at a theory-neutral functional level unless stated otherwise.

The term “psychological” identifies a level of embodied functional organization, not a non-bodily origin, substrate, controller, or one-way psyche-to-body sequence. Neural, autonomic, endocrine, sensorimotor, attentional, inferential, behavioral, and environmental changes may be conditions, constituents, or consequences of one organized operation.

The relevant unit is the organized organism–environment relation, not an isolated interior and not the environment by itself. Relations, institutions, material resources, social positions, cultural regularities, technologies, and built environments enter the operative field only through a specifiable pathway that alters registration, inferred meaning, estimated capacity or resources, available action, or consequences. The field is relational and potentially multiscale, but bounded; unrelated features of the wider world are not thereby psychological.

No moral faculty is postulated. The framework describes regulation, capacity, relation, and possibility, not moral judgment, guilt, blameworthiness, or deserved punishment. Action-related updating concerns what the organism enacts, undergoes, and can bring about in its relations; it does not by itself determine whether an action is right or wrong.

The specific content, weighting, interpretation, and expression organized through this architecture may vary across individuals, developmental histories, relationships, language, and culture. The architecture and its directional organization are proposed at a functional level; they do not assume uniform content, weighting, or expression across persons, developmental stages, or cultures.

The propositions do not share one epistemic status. They use five classes:

E1 — Direct component evidence: the bounded component has been directly studied.

E2 — Convergent construct support: several literatures support component processes or close neighbours, but not necessarily the present synthesis.

F — Framework integration or postulate: supported components are organized into the architecture proposed here; that arrangement is not established by the component evidence.

H — Direct empirical hypothesis: the claim specifies contrasts or observations capable of counting against it.

A — Framework axiom: a declared starting commitment that is not presented as an empirical finding and is not assigned an empirical support score.

Framework axioms, integrations, and hypotheses must not be used as post hoc explanations in the absence of independently specified mechanisms, indicators, and conditions capable of counting against the relevant claim.

Evidence for a component does not establish a broader integration merely because the component is compatible with it. The fifteen propositions below therefore constitute the minimal foundational architecture currently adopted, not a complete or settled theory.

The document stops before detailed accounts of psychological capacity, the mechanisms or taxonomy of psychological defence, meaningful experiential qualities, language-dependent reasoning, identity, psychological stuckness, neurological or substance-related variation, clinical disorder, measurement, or intervention. A boundary-level distinction between general protection and psychological defence is stated only to prevent category collapse; detailed downstream domains must not be inferred from the present propositions alone.

2. Short Terminological Clarifications

Event. Any internally or externally generated change capable of altering subsequent processing. An event may include an environmental occurrence, bodily change, another organism's activity, the organism's own overt or bounded covert activity, or a consequence of that activity.

Information. Detectable variation in internal or external conditions capable of altering subsequent processing or action. No semantic representation or conscious access is implied.

Inference. The organism's arrival at an organized, context-sensitive estimate or orientation. It does not imply verbal reasoning, formal probability calculation, or commitment to Bayesian implementation.

Orientation. A functional organization of organism-relative sensitivity to current condition, environmental possibility and constraint, and possible next trajectories. It is weaker than claiming a proposition-like internal model.

Present other. The specific agent involved in a current reciprocal event. The present other is a locally differentiated agent within the world field, not an additional top-level domain alongside self, world, and future.

Relational-field update. A change in the organism's organized sensitivity to its own condition and agency, its reciprocal relation with a present other, the wider physical and social world, and the trajectories made possible or likely by the current configuration. These are analytic relations within one organization, not independent stores that must all update together.

Directional contribution. A strengthening or weakening of one or more relational or background dimensions. The term does not imply literal points, a common numerical currency, arithmetic summation, or a central internal scorekeeper.

Immediate action-related information. Information generated during action execution before distal outcomes, including bounded action-monitoring, proprioceptive, reafferent, and related bodily information. Its availability is distinguished from any broader interpretation of what the action means.

Background regulatory condition / background self-state. "Background regulatory condition" can be used functionally without implying sentience. "Background self-state" is reserved for organisms independently warranted to have a prereflective phenomenal perspective.

Local preferability. A system-relative weighting that affects selection here and now. It does not imply conscious preference, accuracy, rationality, long-term benefit, pleasure maximization, or enrichment.

Preservation and enrichment. Preservation concerns maintaining viability, integrity, regulation, and continued engagement. Within it, basal viability protection and psychological security are analytically distinguishable. Enrichment concerns increasing the viable quality, flexibility, differentiation, connection, and meaningful range of engagement. Psychological defence is one possible security-oriented protective form, not a synonym for preservation or protection as a whole. Survival, security, and enrichment are proposed as nested and co-present emphases, not fixed stages or a single scalar ladder.

3. The Fifteen Foundational Propositions

Proposition 1 — Continuous and Selective Information Registration

Statement

The organism is continuously exposed to, and selectively registers, information from its body, its environment, immediate action-related information generated during its own activity, and the distal consequences of that activity.

Clarification

Registration is selective: not all available variation is processed equally, represented semantically, made conscious, or retained. Immediate action-related information and distal consequences are listed separately because action can begin to inform subsequent processing before later environmental or social outcomes occur.

Epistemic Category

E1 — Direct component evidence

Scientific Grounding

Exteroceptive, interoceptive, proprioceptive, action-monitoring, sensorimotor-feedback, and closed-loop-regulation research supports the bounded component claim that body, environment, self-generated activity, and later consequences can alter subsequent processing. This evidence does not establish the framework's later relational-field integration of action information (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Engel, Friston, & Kragic, 2016; Kilteni, Engeler, & Ehrsson, 2020; Seth & Friston, 2016).

Proposition 2 — Constructive and Inferential Perception

Statement

Perception is treated in this framework as constructive and inferential: incoming signals are organized in relation to prior organization, current context, and learned regularities.

Clarification

Inference here is nonlinguistic and need not involve explicit reasoning. It refers to the system arriving at an organized perceptual estimate rather than passively copying input. The term does not commit the framework to Bayesian computation, predictive coding, or a particular representational format.

Epistemic Category

E2/F — Broadly supported component dependence; contested framework formulation

Scientific Grounding

Context-sensitive perception, expectation effects, and recurrent perceptual processing strongly support dependence on both incoming information and prior/contextual organization. Predictive-processing accounts formulate this as inference, whereas ecological and enactive approaches emphasize organism–environment information and sensorimotor engagement. The present wording records the framework's functional choice without presenting it as uncontested consensus (Clark, 2013; Gibson, 1979; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Yon, de Lange, & Press, 2019).

Proposition 3 — Perceptual and Broader Nonlinguistic Inference

Statement

Perceptual inference and broader nonlinguistic inference interact bidirectionally and recurrently.

Clarification

Broader inference refers to nonverbal integration extending beyond an immediate perceptual estimate, including learned relations, expectations, current condition, action possibilities, and possible consequences. Perceptual and broader inference are functionally distinguishable but need not occur as serial stages.

Epistemic Category

E2/F — Convergent component support; integrative formulation

Scientific Grounding

Evidence for contextual modulation, recurrent processing, top-down and bottom-up interaction, and continuing perception–action coupling supports mutual constraint across processing levels. The exact division between perceptual and broader inference remains theoretical (Auksztulewicz, Spitzer, & Blankenburg, 2012; Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2014; Seijdel et al., 2021).

Proposition 4 — Dynamic Self–World–Future Orientation

Statement

The framework proposes that recurrent inference maintains a dynamic, organism-relative orientation concerning the organism's current condition and agency, the world's affordances and constraints, and possible trajectories of organism–world interaction.

Clarification

"Self" at this level does not require autobiography or narrative identity. A specific other involved in the current reciprocal event may be locally differentiated within the world field because the organism and that other can affect one another here and now. The wider world includes physical conditions, resources, hazards, institutions, absent persons, classes of possible others, and social regularities relevant to later encounters. "Future" ranges from an immediate action horizon to symbolically extended human possibilities and is treated as the prospective continuation of the current organism–world configuration, not as a separate container alongside self and world. These are analytic relations within one dynamic organization, not independent stores.

Epistemic Category

E2 for component processes; F for their unification as DSWFO

Scientific Grounding

Action-scaled affordance research, action-based perceptual recalibration, newborn body-related multisensory sensitivity, early sensitivity to action efficiency, developmental exploration, and human prospective simulation support the components. They do not validate DSWFO as one established latent variable or innate architecture (Filippetti et al., 2013; Franchak, van der Zalm, & Adolph, 2010; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Skerry, Carey, & Spelke, 2013).

Proposition 5 — Background Regulatory Integration

Statement

Repeated and differentially weighted updates are proposed to contribute across time to a relatively diffuse background regulatory condition; where sentience is independently warranted, this condition may be phenomenally manifested as a prereflective background self-state.

Clarification

The proposed background organization concerns dimensions such as safety, capacity, agency, openness, continuity, relation, and future possibility. It is not identical to mood, core affect, interoceptive feeling, conscience, reflective self-concept, or a second self. Reflective report may track, reinterpret, rationalize, or diverge from it. Contributions concerning self, a present other, the wider world, and possible trajectories may differ in direction and need not collapse into one scalar valence or score. No individual background state can be inferred reliably from one outward action. Once formed, background organization also constrains later registration, threat estimation, action readiness, selection, and the weighting of new information.

Epistemic Category

E2 for neighbouring diffuse and integrative states; F/H for the exact BSS construct and its proposed formation

Scientific Grounding

Core-affect theory supports continuously available diffuse affective organization; integrated-advantage models treat mood as slowly updated integration of action-related appraisals; and minimal-self work distinguishes prereflective agency and ownership from narrative identity. The exact multidimensional BSS construct and its formation through repeated DSWFO updates remain framework proposals requiring operationalization and direct testing (Bennett, Davidson, & Niv, 2022; Gallagher, 2000; Russell, 2003).

Proposition 6 — Bodily Regulation and Action Readiness

Statement

Perceptual and broader processing can generate or modulate bodily change and readiness for action.

Clarification

The claim includes autonomic, endocrine, interoceptive, motor-preparatory, and other regulatory changes. Action readiness does not mean that an overt action must occur, that one fixed response has been selected, or that the bodily change is consciously felt.

Epistemic Category

E1 — Direct component evidence

Scientific Grounding

Appraisal, prediction, and motivational significance can alter bodily regulation, interoceptive processing, and action readiness. This architecture adopts only the functional component and does not specify a neural implementation (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016; Tseng et al., 2023).

Proposition 7 — Immediate Action Information and Distal Consequences

Statement

Action execution generates immediate action-related information before distal outcomes, and both immediate action information and later bodily, environmental, and social consequences can influence subsequent processing. The framework further hypothesizes that action-related information can, depending on context and weighting, contribute to a relational-field update concerning the organism's own subsequent organization, its reciprocal relation with a present other, the wider world's affordances and constraints, and possible next trajectories.

Clarification

The first sentence states a bounded, well-supported component. The second states the content-neutral realized-action evidence hypothesis. The hypothesis does not entail that every action produces an equal, conscious, durable, global, or uniform update; integration may be local, weak, transient, or absent, and different relations may change in different directions. Realization, intention, agency attribution, reflective endorsement, attempted action, achieved outcome, and later consequence must remain distinguishable. Some realized covert activities—such as attentional shifting, inhibition, imagery-dependent regulation, or inner speech—can alter bodily or cognitive conditions and therefore become input to subsequent processing. The stronger claim that every covert activity is integrated across the full relational field in the same way as overt action remains F/H. Fleeting content or an unexecuted intention must not be collapsed with a realized covert operation. Novelty, repetition, salience, prior orientation, attribution, available alternatives, coercion, emotional context, feedback, and competing evidence can alter integration.

Epistemic Category

E1/E2 for immediate action-related information and bounded recalibration; F/H for broader relational-field integration

Scientific Grounding

Self-generated action is processed differently from matched external stimulation, and action performance can recalibrate perceived affordances and self-related estimates. These findings support

immediate action information and bounded action-based recalibration. With objective action–outcome structure held constant, coercion, fear, and anger can alter implicit agency integration. Domain-specific studies also show that a person's conduct can alter self-attribution and estimates of others or relational trust. These findings support bounded possibilities; they do not establish that every realized activity necessarily updates the full relational field (Bandura, 1977; Caspar et al., 2016; Christensen et al., 2019; Franchak, van der Zalm, & Adolph, 2010; Hillebrandt et al., 2023; Kilteni, Engeler, & Ehrsson, 2020; Pitesa, Goh, & Thau, 2018).

Proposition 8 — Recurrent Architecture

Statement

Psychological processing is treated as fundamentally recurrent rather than strictly linear.

Clarification

Recurrence is an architectural property. Although the propositions are presented sequentially for clarity, information, orientation, bodily state, background organization, selection, action, and consequences continue to constrain and update one another over time.

Epistemic Category

E2/F — Convergent component support; integrative architectural principle

Scientific Grounding

Recurrent perceptual processing, feedback connectivity, sensorimotor coupling, and closed-loop regulation support recurrence as a major organizing feature. Their arrangement into the present architecture remains theoretical (Auksztulewicz, Spitzer, & Blankenburg, 2012; Engel, Friston, & Kragic, 2016; Seijdel et al., 2021).

Proposition 9 — Limited Processing and Action Capacity

Statement

The system cannot process all available information and possible actions with equal depth at the same time.

Clarification

This is a limited-capacity claim, not a claim that the organism contains one fixed pool of psychological energy or one bottleneck. Different perceptual, attentional, working-memory, regulatory, and action constraints may operate at different levels and times.

Epistemic Category

E1 — Direct component evidence

Scientific Grounding

Selective-attention, biased-competition, working-memory, and perceptual-load research shows that processing depth and behavioral control are constrained and unevenly allocated (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Lavie, 2005).

Proposition 10 — Selection and Orienting

Statement

Selection and orienting processes allocate limited processing and behavioral resources among competing inputs, interpretations, and action possibilities.

Clarification

Selection is a broad functional term. The proposition does not assume one central executive, one unitary attention system, conscious choice, or a single moment at which all alternatives are compared.

Epistemic Category

E1 — Direct component evidence

Scientific Grounding

Biased-competition and attention-control research shows that competing representations and actions receive differential weighting rather than equal processing (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2014).

Proposition 11 — Local Preferability

Statement

Selection is organized relative to outcomes locally estimated as preferable within the organism's current organization.

Clarification

Preferability does not imply conscious preference, pleasure maximization, accurate long-term prediction, reflective endorsement, or wise choice. It is expressed functionally through regulation, learning, weighting, selection, and action. Local preferability may conflict with viability, broader functioning, reflective preference, and enrichment.

Epistemic Category

E2/F — Broadly supported functional principle; theory-neutral integration

Scientific Grounding

Motivational, reinforcement-learning, homeostatic/allostatic, approach–avoidance, and intrinsic-motivation literatures support value-sensitive selection. They do not establish one common

computational currency or the exact theory-neutral formulation adopted here (Elliot, 2006; Higgins, 1997; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2015; Ryan & Deci, 2000).

Proposition 12 — Axiom of Better Phenomenal Experience

Statement

Where phenomenal experience is independently warranted, the framework adopts movement toward better phenomenal experience as its final interpretive direction.

Clarification

This is a declared axiom, not an empirical finding. “Better” is not defined as immediate pleasure, absence of discomfort, satisfaction of any current desire, moral correctness, or reflective approval. The axiom does not claim conscious purpose, foresight, design, or an independently existing final cause. It does not apply phenomenal language to organisms whose sentience has not been established independently. Phenomenal experience, where invoked, is treated as experience of an embodied organism; this neither reduces emotion to peripheral signals nor implies that every protective process pursues immediate comfort. The axiom’s content requires progressive specification through the preservation–enrichment proposal and later work on meaningful experiential qualities.

Epistemic Category

A — Framework axiom; not evidentially scored

Scientific Grounding

No citation can prove an axiom. Literatures on viability regulation, intrinsic motivation, competence, attachment, play, and well-being provide compatible component phenomena, but they neither establish this as a universal natural law nor determine the axiom’s final operational meaning. The axiom is retained because it declares the framework’s interpretive commitment transparently rather than presenting it as an empirical discovery.

Proposition 13 — Preservation-to-Enrichment Direction

Statement

The framework proposes a nested direction in which organization preserves viability and the possibility of continued regulated engagement and, where conditions and capacities permit, enriches the viable quality, flexibility, differentiation, connection, and meaningful range of that engagement.

Clarification

Preservation and enrichment are not fixed stages. Preservation remains active during enrichment, and enrichment presupposes sufficient preservation without being guaranteed by it. The shorthand survival–security–enrichment identifies nested, co-present emphases: survival most directly concerns viability

and continued life; security concerns inhabitable or manageable embodied engagement; enrichment expands the viable quality and meaningful range of engagement. These are neither exclusive modules nor one-to-one mappings onto particular operations. Psychological defence may contribute to security while opposing survival or longer-term enrichment. Enrichment is not more stimulation, pleasure, reward, power, options, or complexity in the abstract. Development, learning, relationship, language, and culture may shape content and weighting. Failure to observe enrichment under specified facilitating conditions must count against the relevant hypothesis; it cannot be explained solely by invoking an unspecified constraint.

Epistemic Category

E1/E2 for viability regulation and plural enrichment-related components; F/H for their unification as PED

Scientific Grounding

Adaptivity research supports viability-sensitive regulation, while competence, intrinsic motivation, play, and exploration research supports organized activity beyond immediate deficit correction. No cited literature establishes one universal, innate progression from survival toward richness. PED is therefore a framework integration and research proposal, not a discovered biological constant (Deci, 1971; Di Paolo, 2005; Held & Špinka, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2000; White, 1959).

Proposition 14 — Threat Relative to Capacity and Protective Weighting

Statement

As inferred threat increases relative to estimated capacity and available resources, protective weighting increases. Depending on causal organization, this may recruit basal viability regulation, direct non-defensive protective coping, psychological defence, or mixtures of these forms.

Clarification

Threat is used target-neutrally here: an inferred risk of adverse change to a presently relevant candidate protected variable, valued possibility, goal, relation, bodily condition, or expected outcome—not only objective danger or conscious appraisal. This identification must not be defined by the embodied-pressure, capacity, or operation measures later used to test psychological defence. Capacity is used minimally and only in the target-specific formulation: the estimated ability to tolerate, regulate, or manage the predicted demand and its impact. Protection is broader than psychological defence. The dedicated defence statement then tests, rather than assumes, whether independently identified candidate protective reorganisations converge on a potentially vector-valued embodied regulatory objective across intensity, duration, accessibility, controllability, and recoverability. That objective remains F/H; detailed mechanisms and taxonomy are deferred. Protective organisation can alter attention, interpretation, bodily regulation, learning, action, and environmental or relational contact.

Epistemic Category

E1/E2 for threat-dependent protective reorganization; F for the architecture-level threat–capacity formulation; F/H for the three nonexclusive protective distinctions and the vector-valued psychological-defence objective

Scientific Grounding

Threat-imminence research supports systematic changes in defensive responding as inferred danger becomes closer or more intense. Challenge–threat research provides convergent evidence that perceived demands relative to coping resources influence response organization. This evidence does not establish one universal protected variable or an exhaustive one-axis classification or one universal regulatory objective; those remain framework integrations tested in the dedicated defence statement (Abend, 2023; Mobbs et al., 2007; Tomaka et al., 1993, 1997; Tseng et al., 2023).

Proposition 15 — Coexistence and Changing Relative Influence

Statement

Preservation-oriented and enrichment-oriented organization can coexist, with their relative influence changing across time, context, and levels of processing.

Clarification

This is not a two-system claim, a binary mode switch, or a claim that all psychological organization falls into only two categories. The same outward behavior may be organized primarily by defensive pressure, enrichment-related engagement, local reward, or a changing mixture. “Relative influence” or “dominance” means greater causal influence on current selection and organization, not the reason consciously reported or the outward form observed. Inference about dominance therefore requires independently specified contextual contrasts and indicators, such as threat, coercion, viable alternatives, interruption by fear, action–outcome contingency, persistence across changing outcomes, or subsequent changes in agency and possibility. Behavioral form alone cannot identify the underlying weighting. Reduced defensive dominance can widen effective movement without guaranteeing optimal, rational, or morally correct action.

Epistemic Category

E2/F — Broadly supported distinction; integrative architectural formulation

Scientific Grounding

Approach–avoidance, security–exploration, challenge–threat, intrinsic-motivation, attachment, psychodynamic, and humanistic traditions converge on coexistence and shifting motivational influence. They do not establish the precise two-direction architecture proposed here, which remains an

integration rather than a settled taxonomy (Elliot, 2006; Higgins, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Tomaka et al., 1993).

4. Integrated Restatement of the Architecture

The organism is modelled as a continuously updating, embodied, organism–environment process. Prior organization, current bodily condition, environmental information, learned regularities, and current events constrain what is registered, how it matters, what bodily and action organization develops, and what occurs next. The sequence is written linearly only for analysis: prior organization → event processing → bodily and action organization → realized activity → immediate action information plus distal consequences → relational and background update → altered prior organization.



Figure 1. Minimal recurrent architecture. The boxes are analytic cuts through one ongoing organism–environment process, not separate inner modules.

Perception and broader nonlinguistic inference interact recurrently throughout this process. They can alter bodily regulation and readiness for action without requiring words, conscious access, or one central interpreter. Reflective awareness and language belong to the same organism but may only partially access or render the underlying organization; once present, linguistic activity can itself become a new event and source of information.

The framework proposes that recurrent inference maintains a dynamic self–world–future orientation. Within this relational field, the organism's current condition and agency, its reciprocal relation with a present other, the wider physical and social world, and possible next trajectories are analytically distinguishable but not independent containers. The present other is a locally differentiated agent

within the world field. Future orientation is the prospective continuation of the current relational configuration. System-scale conditions participate only where a specifiable coupling changes registration, inferred meaning, resources or capacity, action possibilities, or consequences.

Action both expresses and changes this organization. Realized activity generates immediate action-related information before distal outcomes; later bodily, environmental, and social consequences add further information. Direct evidence establishes this information stream and bounded forms of action-based recalibration. The broader claim that realized overt or bounded covert activity contributes to a relational-field update is F/H. Such integration can be local, weak, mixed, transient, or absent; action, intention, agency attribution, outcome, and later consequence must remain distinguishable.

Repeated and differentially weighted updates may contribute to a diffuse background regulatory condition. Where sentience is independently warranted, this condition may be phenomenally manifested as a prereflective background self-state. Relation-specific contributions may move in different directions without collapsing into one score. The background condition is not only an endpoint: it constrains what is registered, what appears possible, how threat is estimated relative to minimal capacity, what action becomes ready, and how new information is weighted in later cycles.

Because processing and action capacities are limited, selection and orienting allocate resources among competing possibilities. Selection is organized relative to locally estimated preferability, which can be fallible and can diverge from broader viability, reflective preference, and enrichment. No moral judge or common internal currency is implied. Where phenomenal experience is independently warranted, movement toward better phenomenal experience is retained as the framework's explicit axiom rather than an empirical finding.

The framework proposes preservation-to-enrichment as a nested directional organization of that commitment. Survival-oriented basal protection, security-oriented regulation of manageable embodied engagement, and enrichment-related expansion are analytically distinguishable but nested and co-present. As inferred threat rises relative to estimated capacity, protective weighting increases; its implementation may be basal viability regulation, direct coping, psychological defence, or a mixture. Psychological defence is therefore not equated with protection as a whole, and its local preference can conflict with survival or longer-term enrichment. Relative influence is a causal property of current organization and cannot be inferred from behavioral form or conscious report alone.

The resulting architecture is recurrent rather than linear and functionally integrated rather than a claim about one inner module. Its bounded component processes have stronger direct support than the exact DSWFO, relational-field, BSS, and PED integrations. The architecture therefore keeps E1/E2 components, F integrations, H predictions, and the A-level phenomenal commitment explicitly separate.

The architecture stops intentionally at this level. The detailed mechanisms and taxonomy of psychological defence, emotion, psychological capacity, meaningful experiential qualities, psychological stuckness, neurological and substance-related variation, language-dependent reasoning, identity, diagnosis, measurement, and intervention remain reserved for their dedicated documents. Version 2.2 incorporates only the boundary distinctions required for cross-document consistency.

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