SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTUAL ELABORATION

Deep Orientation of the Psychological System

Dynamic self–world–future orientation, activity-related relational updating, background regulatory integration, and the preservation-to-enrichment direction

Version 2.2 | Bounded-Field and Defence-Alignment Revision | July 2026

DOCUMENT FUNCTION Detailed conceptual and evidential elaboration of DSWFO, activity-related relational updating, background regulatory integration/BSS, and PED. Companion to the Foundational Architecture of Psychological Functioning, Version 2.2, incorporating Continuous Inferential Flow in the Psychological System, Version 1.2, and aligned at its boundaries with Foundational Architecture of Psychological Defence, Version 1.5. It does not reproduce a detailed model or taxonomy of defence, stuckness, diagnosis, neurological implementation, capacity, or intervention.

Supersedes the previous Deep Orientation supplement

Executive scientific statement

The foundational architecture models psychological functioning as a recurrent embodied organism–environment process. Prior organization, bodily condition, environmental information, learned regularities, and current events constrain what is registered, how the situation matters, what bodily and action organization develops, what is selected, and what occurs next. The organism's realized activity generates immediate action-related information before distal outcomes; later bodily, environmental, and social consequences add further information. The altered organization then constrains the next cycle.

This document develops four analytic contributions within that recurrent process. **Dynamic self–world–future orientation (DSWFO)** names the system's continuously changing, organism-relative sensitivity to its own condition and agency, the world's affordances and constraints, and possible next trajectories. **Activity-related relational updating** specifies how realized overt or bounded covert activity can become new information concerning what the organism enacts and undergoes, how it and a present other affect one another, how the wider world can be modified or can impose on the organism, and what trajectories become possible. **Background regulatory integration** names the proposed accumulation of repeated and differentially weighted updates into a relatively diffuse condition that influences later processing; the term **background self-state (BSS)** is reserved for its possible prereflective phenomenal manifestation where sentience is independently warranted. **The preservation-to-enrichment direction (PED)** proposes a nested organization in which continued regulated engagement is protected and, where conditions and capacities permit, its viable quality and meaningful range are expanded.

Version 2.2 retains Version 2.0's correction of the earlier independent-domain ambiguity and adds two boundaries required by the later defence work. First, "psychological" identifies an embodied level of organization rather than a non-bodily origin. Second, the organism-relative field can be multiscale but is not unlimited: wider systems enter only through specifiable causal coupling. Self, present other, wider world, and future remain analytic relations within one organization; broader integration can be local, weak, mixed, transient, or absent.

The evidence is uneven by design and is stated honestly. Direct evidence supports bounded nonlinguistic regulation, action monitoring, self-generated sensory information, action-based recalibration, context-sensitive agency, early body-related differentiation, and recurrent sensorimotor feedback. Convergent literatures support prospective orientation, diffuse affective integration, minimal selfhood, viability regulation, exploration, competence, play, and intrinsic motivation. The exact DSWFO, relational-field, BSS, and PED syntheses remain framework integrations and testable hypotheses. Movement toward better phenomenal experience remains an explicit framework axiom rather than an empirical discovery.

Core decision	Version 2.2 disposition
DSWFO	Retain, but define it as one relational orientation rather than three or four independent domains.

Core decision	Version 2.2 disposition
Activity as evidence	Retain the well-supported immediate information stream; replace universal four-domain updating with bounded, context-sensitive relational-field updating as F/H.
Background organization / BSS	Retain with a strict functional–phenomenal distinction and recurrent feedback into later cycles.
PED	Retain as F/H, separate from the A-level commitment to better phenomenal experience and from local preferability.
Developmental and cross-species claims	Retain only at the level warranted by each component; reject both adult structure at birth and complete undifferentiated fusion.
Stuckness, detailed defence, capacity, emotion taxonomy, and intervention	Keep detailed mechanisms outside this document; incorporate only the protection/defence and bounded-field boundaries required for consistency.

Table 1. The locked decisions governing Version 2.2.

1. Purpose, document relationships, and scope

1.1 Function within the document family

The documents have different jobs and should not be collapsed:

Document	Function	Authority in its domain
Foundational Architecture of Psychological Functioning, Version 2.2	States the minimal adopted architecture in fifteen propositions.	Canonical architectural skeleton.
Deep Orientation of the Psychological System, Version 2.2	Develops the conceptual meaning, evidential limits, boundary cases, and research program of DSWFO, activity-related relational updating, background integration/BSS, and PED.	Detailed theoretical and evidential elaboration.
Continuous Inferential Flow in the Psychological System, Version 1.2	Specifies the event-centred process by which activity and consequences can alter relational and background organization.	Mechanism-level clarification adopted by this version.
Foundational Architecture of Psychological Defence, Version 1.5	Develops the downstream architecture of psychological defence and three nonexclusive protective distinction.	Separate downstream model; supplies boundary clarifications adopted here without importing its full mechanism.
Foundational Architecture of Psychological Stuckness, Version 2.0	Develops a downstream account of persistent constrained organization.	Separate model; not imported here.

Table 2. Division of labor among the current documents.

The present document does not supersede the foundational architecture and does not reproduce the full continuous-flow or defence statements. It adopts their architecture-relevant corrections and explains their implications for the deeper orientation model. Where formulations differ, the bounded relational-field formulation in this Version 2.2 governs the present document.

1.2 Functional, not homuncular

"The system" means the functioning organism. It does not name a hidden subject that watches behavior, translates it into sentences, assigns positive or negative grades, or keeps an internal ledger. Terms such as *estimate*, *evidence*, *orientation*, *directional contribution*, and *updating* describe changes in functional sensitivity and organization. They do not require explicit propositions, symbolic records, Bayesian computation, a central executive, or conscious access.

Likewise, functional integration does not imply one neural module, circuit, algorithm, or indivisible biological process. Several interacting, developmentally shaped processes may implement the relations described here.

The term "psychological" identifies a level of embodied functional organization, not a non-bodily origin, substrate, controller, or one-way psyche-to-body sequence. Neural, autonomic, endocrine, sensorimotor, attentional, inferential, behavioral, and environmental changes may be conditions, constituents, or consequences of one organized process.

The unit of analysis is the organized organism–environment relation. Family, organizational, economic, legal, cultural, technological, and built-environment systems may constrain this relation by changing probabilities, meanings, sanctions, resources, support, available actions, or consequences. They enter only through a specifiable pathway to the local process; the field is relational and potentially multiscale, but bounded, and the environment taken by itself is not psychological.

1.3 Nonlinguistic operation, development, and language

Bounded processes of regulation, perception, contingency detection, expectation, action monitoring, learning, and selection can operate without online words or sentences. Their results may shape conscious experience and, where reflectively accessed, may later be rendered into language. Verbal rendering can be useful, partial, distorted, rationalized, or absent. Once available, language, narrative, and communication can themselves become events and information for later cycles.

Nonlinguistic, prelinguistic, biologically implemented, present at birth, developmentally emerging, experience-dependent, and genetically specified are different claims. Evidence for language-independent component operations does not establish that the exact DSWFO–relational-field–BSS–PED architecture is fully formed at birth, genetically fixed, developmentally invariant, or independent of prenatal learning, postnatal contingency, relationship, language, and culture (DeCasper & Spence, 1986; Emberson, Richards, & Aslin, 2015; Mameli & Bateson, 2006; Partanen et al., 2013).

1.4 Sentience and explanatory levels

This framework does not determine which organisms are sentient. Criteria for attributing sentience are independent of, and outside the scope of, this framework. Where sentience is not independently

warranted, only functional and regulatory language is justified. Phenomenal terms—including felt background state and better phenomenal experience—apply only under an independent sentience warrant.

Three explanatory levels must therefore remain distinct:

Level	Meaning
Organizational	Nonlinguistic regulation, updating, weighting, and selection. It need not be felt, reportable, or propositionally represented.
Phenomenal	Where sentience is present, organization may manifest as diffuse bodily or affective tone, ease, pressure, openness, constriction, vitality, or deadness.
Reflective–narrative	Explicit beliefs and stories about self, other people, world, future, morality, and intention. These may render, reinterpret, rationalize, or fail to detect the underlying organization.

Table 3. Distinct but interacting explanatory levels.

Discordance across levels does not imply a second self. One organism may simultaneously carry immediate pleasure, an approving narrative, defensive weighting, and a more constricted background organization.

1.5 No moral faculty and no universal content

Activity-related updating concerns enacted capacity, causal influence, relation, possibility, and consequence. It does not constitute an inner moral judgment and does not by itself imply guilt, blame, desert, moral truth, or punishment. Learning, cooperation, avoidance, deception, creation, repair, aggression, and security violation are content-specific applications. No one content defines the general architecture, and each requires its own evidence.

1.6 Deliberate deferrals

This document does not specify:

- the full structure of psychological capacity, including skill, competence, available resources, or tolerance of bodily symptoms;
- a taxonomy or complete mechanism of emotion, impulse, affect release, bodily symptom generation, or bodily regulation;
- the detailed architecture or taxonomy of defence, conflict, psychological stuckness, diagnosis, case formulation, measurement thresholds, or intervention;
- neural implementation, substance-related variation, or neurological rule-outs;
- language-dependent identity, autobiographical organization, or moral development.

Capacity appears only in the minimal parent-architecture sense: estimated ability and available resources relative to demand. Bodily and affective changes can enter the present model as conditions and information, but their detailed origin and regulation are reserved for later work. The separate defence

statement is used here only for boundary alignment: protection is broader than psychological defence, and wider systems require a traceable local pathway.

2. Epistemic method

2.1 Five explicit classes

Class	Meaning
E1 — Direct component evidence	A bounded component has been directly studied with relevant behavioral, physiological, or phenomenological measures.
E2 — Convergent construct support	Several literatures support component processes or close neighbours, but not necessarily the present synthesis.
F — Framework integration or postulate	Supported components are organized into the architecture proposed here; the arrangement itself is not established by the component evidence.
H — Direct empirical hypothesis	The claim specifies contrasts or observations capable of counting against it.
A — Framework axiom	A declared starting commitment, not an empirical finding and not assigned empirical support by definition.

Table 4. Epistemic classes used throughout this document.

Evidence for a component cannot be promoted silently into evidence for a larger synthesis. For example, efference copy and proprioceptive feedback support immediate activity-related information; they do not establish that every activity updates the entire relational field. Likewise, evidence for core affect or mood integration does not validate BSS as defined here.

2.2 Retirement of numerical support scores

The previous supplement attached decimal scores to claims. Those scores were transparent judgments but were neither effect sizes, meta-analytic estimates, nor calibrated probabilities. Version 2.0 retired them because decimal precision can imply a measurement basis that does not exist; Version 2.2 retains that decision. Scientific status is represented by the E1/E2/F/H/A class, inferential distance, scope conditions, contrary cases, and explicit tests.

2.3 Anti-post-hoc safeguard

Framework axioms, integrations, and hypotheses must not be used as post-hoc explanations without independently specified mechanisms, indicators, contrasts, and conditions capable of counting against the relevant claim. Unspecified defence, hidden capacity, inaccessible “deep meaning,” or an unmeasured background state cannot be invoked solely to immunize an interpretation from failure.

2.4 Relation to predictive processing and active inference

Predictive-processing and active-inference theories provide formal accounts of recurrent perception, action, learning, and regulation (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2015). The present framework overlaps functionally in treating processing as recurrent, embodied, and prospective, but it does not adopt a Bayesian generative model, free-energy objective, precision formalism, policy-selection scheme, or specific neural process theory. Those frameworks are comparisons, not evidence that DSWFO, relational-field updating, BSS, or PED is true.

3. Dynamic self–world–future orientation

PROPOSED TERM Dynamic self–world–future orientation (DSWFO)

COMPACT DEFINITION The continuously changing functional organization of organism-relative sensitivity to the organism's current condition and agency, the world's affordances and constraints, and possible trajectories of organism–world interaction.

EPISTEMIC STATUS E2 for component processes; F for their unification under one named construct.

3.1 Why “orientation”

Orientation is intentionally weaker than a claim that the organism stores a sentence-like or proposition-like internal model. Ecological, enactive, dynamical, predictive, and learning-based approaches disagree about representational form but converge on a functional point: behavior depends on sensitivity to current organismic condition, environmental opportunity and constraint, and what can happen next (Gibson, 1979; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). DSWFO names this common organization without deciding the representation debate.

The construct is dynamic because current bodily state, prior learning, environmental context, present interaction, activity, and consequence continually constrain it. It is organism-relative because a doorway, threat, relationship, or future opportunity matters relative to the organism's body, history, current resources, and possible activity. It is not a detached map of the world.

3.2 One relational organization, not independent stores

Version 2.0 replaced the earlier “three-domain” and “four-domain” wording with a relational formulation:

Analytic focus	Functional content
Organism / self	Current bodily and regulatory condition, agency, estimated capability, vulnerability, ownership, continuity, and learned efficacy. “Self” at this level does not require autobiography.
Present other within world	The particular agent involved in a current reciprocal event: what the organism can do to or with this agent, and what this agent can do to, permit, block, or evoke in the organism.

Analytic focus	Functional content
Wider world	Physical regularities, resources, hazards, institutions, absent persons, classes of possible others, social regularities, and apparent modifiability, included only through specifiable organism-relevant coupling.
Prospective continuation	Possible next states and trajectories emerging from the current relational configuration, from immediate action horizons to symbolically extended human futures.

Table 5. Analytic foci within one organism-relative orientation.

The present other is not an extra top-level domain. The category marks a local differentiation because reciprocal influence with one currently encountered agent may be more immediate and specific than a generalized expectation of people or the world. Information can remain other-specific, or generalize with repetition, similarity, salience, and prior organization.

The future is not an independent container. It is the prospective continuation of the current organism–world relation. If current organization changes from "I cannot influence this interaction" to "I can set an effective boundary," the range and apparent likelihood of next trajectories can change without a separate future store receiving a message. In humans, anticipatory anxiety can be one phenomenal expression of an unfavorable possible trajectory, but the model does not equate future orientation with anxiety.

3.3 A relational topology

The field can be analysed through several directional relations:

- **Self → self:** how self-generated activity changes the organism's subsequent condition, agency, estimated capability, integrity, or openness. This is causal shorthand, not a relation between two selves.
- **Self → present other:** what the organism's activity can bring about in the specific other currently encountered.
- **Present other → self:** what this agent can do to, permit, block, or evoke in the organism here and now.
- **Self → world:** what the organism can alter, create, preserve, damage, or make possible in the wider physical and social field.
- **World → self:** what the wider environment—including absent or possible future others—affords, constrains, supplies, threatens, or imposes.
- **Present other → world:** what the encountered other reveals about how agents can alter the shared field, insofar as this changes the organism's orientation.

These are analytic relations within one causal process. They need not change together, in the same direction, to the same degree, or at all.

The relational field can include conditions operating at several scales. Housing, organizational hierarchy, economic precarity, law, discrimination, cultural sanction, technology, and built environments may alter actual stakes, learned probability, action cost, support, recovery resources, and possible trajectories. Their

inclusion requires a specified coupling to registration, meaning, capacity, action, or consequence. An unrelated environmental fact is outside the operative field merely by being present in the wider world.

3.4 What DSWFO adds

DSWFO specifies the organized content toward which recurrent inference is directed without reducing that content to conscious thought. It makes “what is happening to and through this organism?” and “what can happen next?” architectural questions even when no words are composed. It bridges momentary events with a relatively persistent background condition and allows timescale and complexity to vary without projecting adult symbolic foresight onto infants or other species.

3.5 Developmental differentiation

The architecture should assume neither an adult-like separation of self, other, world, and future at birth nor complete undifferentiated fusion. Newborn sensitivity to body-related multisensory synchrony supports rudimentary organism-related differentiation; first-person action experience in prereaching infants supports early action-sensitive organization (Filippetti et al., 2013; Skerry, Carey, & Spelke, 2013). These findings do not establish a reflective self, a fully differentiated relational field, or an innate DSWFO synthesis.

The defensible claim is graded differentiation. Bounded biological capacities and early learning support increasingly articulated agency, relational specificity, generalization, and temporal reach. Prenatal exposure, postnatal contingency, attachment, learning, language, and culture can all shape this development; the exact timing and causal weights remain open.

3.6 Scientific grounding and limits

Action-scaled affordance research shows that perceived possibilities depend on the actor's body and skill and can be recalibrated through action experience (Franchak, van der Zalm, & Adolph, 2010). Early body-related and action-efficiency findings support prelinguistic components (Filippetti et al., 2013; Skerry et al., 2013). Prospective simulation and developmental exploration support future-sensitive organization at different levels of complexity (Poli et al., 2025; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). These literatures support components. They do not establish DSWFO as one latent variable, one innate architecture, or one neural process.

4. Activity-related relational updating

PROPOSED TERM Activity-related relational updating; bounded empirical core: immediate activity-related information; broader framework hypothesis: realized-activity evidence.

COMPACT DEFINITION Realized activity generates immediate activity-related information before distal outcomes. Depending on context and weighting, this information may contribute to changes in the

organism's relational orientation concerning its own subsequent organization, reciprocal relations with a present other, the wider world, and possible next trajectories. Later consequences provide additional information that can confirm, qualify, oppose, or reverse the provisional contribution.

EPISTEMIC STATUS E1/E2 for immediate activity information, action monitoring, and bounded recalibration; F/H for broader relational-field integration; separately classified evidence for each content-specific application.

4.1 The established bounded component

Action execution is already informative before a distal result arrives. Motor command, proprioception, reafference, action monitoring, effort, fluency, resistance, and relevant interoceptive change can alter subsequent processing. Self-generated touch is processed differently from matched external touch, and action performance can recalibrate perceived affordances (Franchak et al., 2010; Kilteni, Engeler, & Ehrsson, 2020). This establishes an immediate activity-related information stream and bounded action-based recalibration.

It does not establish the meaning of every action, a universal update, or a global change in self, world, and future. The broader relational interpretation is a separate hypothesis.

4.2 Event and activity

An **event** is any internally or externally generated change capable of altering subsequent processing. It may include an environmental occurrence, another organism's activity, a bodily change, the organism's own overt action, a realized bounded covert activity, or a later consequence.

Treating self-generated activity as an event does not erase agency. It captures the fact that, once realized, the activity changes the organism's causal situation. The organism is subsequently exposed to what it has enacted in its body, its relation, and its environment.

The event-centred sequence is analytically stated as:

1. Prior organization constrains registration.
2. Constructive perception and broader nonlinguistic inference organize significance and possibility.
3. Bodily regulation and action readiness change.
4. Selection gives some tendency greater relative influence.
5. Overt or bounded covert activity may be realized, inhibited, revised, or abandoned.
6. Realized activity generates immediate information.
7. Bodily, environmental, and social consequences add further information.
8. Relational orientation and background organization may change and constrain the next cycle.

These are not sealed modules. They can overlap, recur internally, and constrain one another during a single unfolding event.

4.3 Activity, attempt, outcome, consequence, and omission

The architecture must keep several distinctions open:

Term	Meaning
Activity	An overt or bounded covert operation that is realized.
Attempt	Activity organized toward an outcome that may or may not occur.
Immediate activity information	Information generated in and by realization before distal outcomes.
Outcome	A bodily or environmental transition produced or not produced by the activity.
Later consequence	Subsequent bodily, environmental, or social information following the activity or outcome.
Realized restraint	Active inhibition, withholding, or disengagement that itself changes bodily or cognitive conditions.
Mere omission	Nonoccurrence without evidence of a realized inhibitory or regulatory operation.

Table 6. Distinctions required for activity-related updating.

A failed attempt can inform effort, resistance, current capability, and environmental constraint even when the intended outcome does not occur. A favorable outcome does not prove free selection, agency, or enrichment. An outcome can arise through luck, coercion, another agent, or a process the organism did not control. Conversely, meaningful activity can occur without the desired outcome.

4.4 The broader relational-field hypothesis

Depending on context and weighting, realized activity may contribute evidence about:

- what this organism enacts under these conditions;
- how its activity changes its own subsequent bodily, regulatory, or agentic organization;
- what it can and cannot influence now;
- what a present other permits, resists, undergoes, or does in response;
- what relations are realizable between this organism and that other;
- how modifiable, supportive, dangerous, indifferent, or open the wider world appears; and
- what immediate or extended trajectories are becoming more or less available.

This formulation is content-neutral. Practicing, creating, helping, approaching, withdrawing, freezing, deceiving, repairing, exploring, attacking, cooperating, setting a boundary, and persisting are applications—not proof of the general hypothesis.

The word *may* is essential. Broader integration can be local, weak, transient, mixed, context-bound, rapidly reversed, or absent. Immediate activity information is available to subsequent processing; no claim follows that every analytic relation must change.

4.5 Directional contribution, not points

Informal description may say that an event gives “positive” or “negative points” to self, other, world, or future. The scientific formulation is **directional contribution**: information may strengthen or weaken organized safety, agency, estimated capability, integrity, controllability, relational openness, continuity, and future possibility.

No common numerical currency, arithmetic summation rule, central scorekeeper, discrete message, or explicit record is postulated. An event may contribute positively on one relation and negatively on another. Distinct dimensions can remain partly dissociated and influence different later processes or timescales.

4.6 Mixed updates and causal organization

Consider resistance to an assault. Effective resistance may support self-related agency and integrity while also providing information that this present other is dangerous, that social safety is compromised, and that future threat remains possible. The activity can therefore support one relation while worsening others. The architecture does not require a net single valence.

Retreat illustrates why outward form is insufficient. Retreat under dominating fear with no experienced alternative can contribute to constrained agency even if it reduces immediate danger. Deliberate disengagement chosen among viable alternatives may preserve agency, integrity, or a meaningful future. Whether one or the other organization has greater causal influence cannot be read directly from the movement “leaving.”

Dominance means greater causal influence on current selection and organization, not the reason consciously reported. Inference about dominance requires independently specified contrasts and indicators such as threat, coercion, viable alternatives, action–outcome contingency, interruption by fear, persistence across outcome changes, or subsequent shifts in agency and possibility.

4.7 Coercion, emotion, and agency attribution

The same objective action–outcome relation can be integrated differently under coercion, fear, anger, or free choice. Intentional-binding experiments have found altered implicit agency under coercion and under fear or anger while objective causation is held constant (Caspar et al., 2016; Christensen et al., 2019). These results do not prove the full relational-field model, but they rule out a formulation in which realized movement alone determines the update.

The current organization, available alternatives, experienced authorship, effort, affective condition, and action–outcome contingency can change what the activity contributes. A later theory of emotion will need to specify these processes more deeply; this document uses them only as established moderators and information sources.

4.8 Overt and covert activity

Overt action clearly generates motor, proprioceptive, sensory, and consequence information. Some covert activities—such as a realized attentional shift, active inhibition, imagery-dependent regulation, or inner speech—can alter bodily or cognitive conditions and thereby become new input. The stronger claim that every covert activity is integrated across the relational field like overt action remains F/H.

Mere fleeting content, an unexecuted intention, passive occurrence of a thought, and a realized covert operation must not be collapsed. “Internal behavior” is useful only when the operation and its causal consequences are specified.

4.9 Activity as information for other organisms

An organism's activity can inform its own subsequent organization and simultaneously become information for another organism. Posture, dress, timing, proximity, persistence, withdrawal, indirect conduct, and silence can alter another person's estimates even without an intended semantic message. The present model develops the actor-side update. Receiver-side inference and interpersonal signaling are compatible extensions, not proof that the actor consciously communicated or that both organisms constructed the same meaning.

4.10 Content examples and the security corollary

Content	Illustrative relational contribution—not a guaranteed result
Skill practice	Information about current capability, task resistance, learnability, and possible future competence. Failed or poorly structured practice can instead reveal limitation.
Creation or exploration	Information that new structure can be brought forth and that further possibilities may be discoverable.
Cooperation or repair	Information that mutual influence, support, and restoration can be enacted; manipulative help may instantiate a different relation.
Withdrawal or avoidance	Information that distance changes demand; the self-related contribution depends on threat, alternatives, agency, and consequences.
Deception or exploitation	Information about the organism's enacted influence and about whether relations and information can be manipulated; estimates of others and trust may change.
Boundary-setting	Potential support for self-agency and integrity, together with separate information about the other and the wider world's controllability or danger.
Security violation	Information that security can be disrupted and that domination or harm is realizable; generalization to the actor's own vulnerability is a separate content-specific hypothesis.

Table 7. Applications of the relational-field hypothesis.

Conduct can inform self-attribution and efficacy; mandated insincerity can alter perceived self-honesty, perceived honesty of others, and trust; and self-interested unethical conduct can increase state paranoia and reduce affiliation (Bandura, 1977; Bem, 1967; Hillebrandt et al., 2023; Pitesa, Goh, & Thau, 2018).

These findings support bounded cross-relational effects. They do not prove that every activity produces a universal field update.

The stronger **security corollary** proposes that enacting a security violation may increase the actor's own sensitivity to possible vulnerability when actor and target are represented within a relevant shared field. This remains F/H. It is not entailed by immediate activity information, does not require conscious guilt, and must be tested apart from retaliation, punishment, moral demand, and payoff.

5. Background regulatory integration and background self-state

PROPOSED TERMS Background regulatory condition; background self-state (BSS) only where sentience is independently warranted.

COMPACT DEFINITION The relatively diffuse, recurrently updated organization of safety, agency, estimated capability, openness, continuity, relation, and future possibility that constrains subsequent registration, weighting, action readiness, and selection; in sentient organisms it may have a prereflective phenomenal manifestation.

EPISTEMIC STATUS E2 for neighbouring diffuse affective and integrative states; F/H for the exact multidimensional synthesis and its proposed formation through repeated relational updates.

5.1 Functional and phenomenal layers

Layer	Meaning
Basal regulatory condition	Viability-relevant organization and action readiness. Can be used across organisms without claiming a felt self.
Background self-state	Where sentience is independently warranted, the prereflective tone of being this organism in this situation: for example safe or unsafe, capable or helpless, open or constricted, connected or isolated, continuing or foreclosed.
Reflective appraisal	Explicit claims such as “I am fine,” “I am powerless,” or “the world is safe.” These can track, reinterpret, rationalize, or misdescribe background organization.

Table 8. Layered terminology preventing an unsupported sentience inference.

5.2 From event to background organization

No single event defines the organism. An event can make an immediate provisional contribution without creating a durable pattern. Novelty, salience, repetition, prior organization, attribution, contingency, bodily intensity, feedback, similarity across contexts, and competing evidence can affect whether a contribution is weak, transient, reinforced, generalized, or reversed.

Repeated and differentially weighted relational contributions are proposed to alter the background condition across time. They need not be stored as separate propositions or averaged into one score. A

specific other may remain organized as dangerous while the wider world remains mixed; self-agency may strengthen while relational openness narrows; immediate safety may improve while prospective possibility constricts.

5.3 Not mood, core affect, conscience, or self-concept

Neighbouring concept	Relation to BSS
Mood / core affect	Closest empirical neighbours. They support diffuse valence/arousal or slowly integrated advantage. BSS is broader because it explicitly includes relational and prospective organization.
Interoceptive feeling	A possible input and manifestation, not the complete construct.
Conscience	Rejected as the scientific label. BSS is not an inner judge and issues no moral verdict.
Reflective self-concept	A later reportable construction that may access or rationalize background organization but is not identical to it.
Personality trait	A longer-timescale descriptive regularity; BSS can fluctuate and does not by itself explain trait stability.
A second self	Rejected. BSS is a functional or phenomenal state of one organism.

Table 9. Boundaries of the background construct.

Core-affect theory treats valence and activation as broadly available background properties whose causes may remain opaque (Russell, 2003). The integrated-advantage model treats mood as diffuse, slowly updated integration of recent action-related advantage (Bennett, Davidson, & Niv, 2022). Minimal-self work distinguishes prereflective agency and ownership from narrative identity (Gallagher, 2000). These literatures make BSS plausible; none validates its exact relational–prospective profile.

5.4 Discordance across levels

Immediate pleasure and reflective self-approval can coexist with a narrower or more defensive background organization. A powerful person may experience reward, status, and explicit confidence while repeated conduct organizes relations around control, distrust, and escalating protection. Conversely, acute discomfort can accompany an activity that supports longer-timescale agency, repair, or openness.

The framework can describe these possibilities without claiming secret verbal guilt or an infallible deeper truth. It cannot infer an individual's BSS from one act, one symptom, one narrative, or one observer's moral evaluation. Construct validation requires multiple indicators, repeated measurements, contextual contrasts, and attention to timescale.

5.5 Background organization is recurrent, not terminal

The background condition changes what is registered, what appears salient or possible, how threat is estimated relative to minimal capacity, which actions become ready, and how new information is weighted. It is therefore both an outcome of prior cycles and a constraint on later cycles:

> prior organization → event processing → bodily and action organization → activity information and consequences → relational update → altered background organization → later registration and selection

The arrow sequence is explanatory shorthand. It does not imply a single linear mechanism or clean temporal separation among all operations.

6. The preservation-to-enrichment direction

PROPOSED TERM Preservation-to-enrichment direction (PED)

COMPACT DEFINITION A nested directional architecture in which organization protects viability and the possibility of inhabitable regulated engagement and, where conditions and capacities permit, expands the viable quality, flexibility, differentiation, connection, and meaningful range of that engagement.

EPISTEMIC STATUS E1/E2 for viability regulation and plural bounded evidence on exploration, competence, play, and intrinsic motivation; F/H for their unification as one nested direction.

6.1 Axiom and hypothesis must remain separate

Where phenomenal experience is independently warranted, the framework adopts movement toward better phenomenal experience as its final interpretive direction. This is A, a declared axiom. It is not an empirical finding, a biological constant, or a sentience test. “Better” is not defined as immediate pleasure, lack of discomfort, satisfaction of any current desire, moral correctness, or reflective approval. Phenomenal experience is treated here as experience of an embodied organism without reducing emotion to peripheral signals.

PED is the **F/H-level proposal** for how preservation and enrichment may organize that commitment. No citation can prove the axiom, and component evidence cannot turn PED into a universal natural law.

6.2 The directional formula

> Preserve viability and the possibility of inhabitable regulated engagement; where possible, enrich the viable quality and meaningful range of that engagement.

If the only goal were to feel better immediately, costly protection would appear paradoxical. The paradox changes when current experience, viability, inhabitable engagement, and longer trajectories are distinguished. Protective organization can worsen immediate experience while preserving viability or future possibility. The separate defence statement distinguishes candidate psychological defence more

narrowly through target-neutral adverse-trajectory-sensitive protective reorganization and then tests a separate embodied objective: keeping contact with an anticipated, emerging, or current embodied phenomenal state within a presently estimated manageable envelope. The objective may be vector-valued across intensity, duration, accessibility, controllability, and recoverability. Such an operation may support, ignore, or oppose survival. Under more facilitating conditions, relatively greater influence may shift toward exploration, competence, play, relation, creativity, integration, and other meaningful qualities.

This document does not reproduce the detailed defence architecture or a taxonomy of defensive operations. It retains only the directional distinctions required for PED: protection is broader than psychological defence; basal viability protection, direct protective coping, and psychological defence are nonexclusive analytic distinctions that cut across different axes; and psychological defence can conflict with survival or longer-term enrichment.

6.3 Nested and co-present, not sequential stages

Direction	Definition
Preservation	Maintaining viability, integrity, regulation, and access to continued engagement. Basal viability protection and security-oriented regulation are analytically distinguishable; psychological defence is not synonymous with all protection.
Enrichment	Increasing the viable, coherent, agentic, connected, differentiated, and experientially meaningful ways in which engagement can occur.
Relation	Survival, security, and enrichment are nested, co-present emphases rather than modules, fixed stages, or a single scalar ladder. One operation may support one while opposing another.

Table 10. Nested preservation and enrichment.

Survival, security, and enrichment provide a pedagogical articulation of PED, not three modules or sequential stages. Survival most directly concerns viability and continued life; security concerns keeping embodied engagement within an inhabitable or manageable range; enrichment expands its viable quality and meaningful range. The organism need not label these influences online. They remain nested and co-present, and one activity can support one while opposing another.

6.4 Local preferability is not enrichment

Local preferability is the weighting that helps selection here and now. It can reflect immediate reward, familiarity, pressure reduction, learned expectation, or defensive urgency. PED introduces a broader and longer-horizon question: does recurrent organization preserve and expand inhabitable quality, or does it progressively constrict agency, relation, viability, and prospective openness?

More pleasure, stimulation, power, options, novelty, or complexity is not automatically enrichment. Enrichment concerns possibilities the organism can sustain and integrate without systematically degrading viability, agency, relation, or future openness. In humans, vitality, curiosity, competence, connection, care,

play, creativity, coherence, contribution, and presence may be meaningful qualities. They are neither a mandatory checklist nor fully operationalized in this document.

6.5 Threat relative to capacity

Threat is used target-neutrally here: an inferred adverse trajectory involving some presently relevant candidate protected variable or valued possibility. As its importance rises, protective weighting is expected to increase. Depending on causal organization, this may recruit basal viability regulation, direct non-defensive protective coping, candidate psychological defence, or mixtures. The dedicated defence statement then separately tests whether valid candidates converge on a capacity-relative embodied regulatory objective across intensity, duration, accessibility, controllability, and recoverability. Capacity remains minimal here: estimated ability to tolerate, regulate, or manage the predicted demand and its impact. The exact psychological-defence objective and full capacity structure remain F/H and are developed elsewhere.

Reduced psychological-defensive dominance can reopen effective movement toward enrichment, but does not guarantee rational, optimal, moral, or beneficial activity. Basal viability protection or direct coping may remain strongly active. Survival, security, and enrichment remain co-present, and the same outward behavior can instantiate different mixtures.

6.6 Scientific and philosophical status

Adaptivity research supplies a disciplined language for regulation relative to viability conditions (Di Paolo, 2005). Research on competence, intrinsic motivation, curiosity, manipulation, play, and learning progress supports organized activity beyond immediate deficit correction (Deci, 1971; Harlow, Harlow, & Meyer, 1950; Held & Špinka, 2011; Poli et al., 2025; Ryan & Deci, 2000; White, 1959). These plural literatures do not establish a single universal progression from survival to richness.

PED is therefore a naturalistic framework integration and research proposal. It is not an innate telos, evolutionary ladder, discovered law, guarantee of improvement, or claim that culture merely fills a fixed biological template. Development, learning, relationships, language, and culture may shape content, weighting, and expression. Failure to observe the predicted enrichment pattern under independently specified facilitating conditions must count against the relevant hypothesis; an unspecified constraint cannot be invoked as the sole explanation.

6.7 Presence as a phenomenological bridge

Contemplative or mystical descriptions of presence may inspire hypotheses about prereflective access. Sustained attention can sometimes make background bodily or relational organization more available and reduce narrative noise. This is not evidence for an infallible inner wisdom. Presence does not guarantee correct judgment, adequate information, freedom from defence, moral truth, or direct access to the full architecture.

7. Integrated recurrent architecture

The four contributions are not four inner modules. They are analytic cuts through one recurrent architecture:

- DSWFO describes the organization being maintained;
- activity-related updating describes one route by which realized activity and later consequences may alter that organization;
- background integration describes how repeated weighted contributions may form a diffuse condition that also constrains later cycles; and
- PED describes a proposed longer-horizon direction of weighting, while the axiom of better phenomenal experience declares the framework's interpretive commitment where sentience is independently warranted.



Figure 1. Integrated recurrent architecture. Immediate activity-related information is an E1/E2 component; the broader relational-field, BSS, and PED integrations are F/H. The boxes are analytic distinctions within one organism–environment process, not independent inner modules.

7.1 Theory-neutral formal sketch

The notation below is explanatory shorthand, not a commitment to a specific algorithm, latent variable, probability distribution, neural circuit, or scalar score.

Function	Theory-neutral notation
Current information	I_t = {body, environment, present-other activity, own immediate activity information, later consequences}

Function	Theory-neutral notation
Relational orientation	$O_t = U(O_{t-1}, I_t, \text{context})$, where O organizes organism condition and agency, reciprocal present-other relations, wider-world affordances and constraints, and prospective trajectories.
Background integration	$B_t = G(B_{t-1}, O_t, \text{weighting, timescale})$; phenomenal manifestation is claimed only where sentience is independently warranted.
Directional weighting	W_t includes survival-, security-, and enrichment-related influence; inferred threat relative to minimal capacity is expected to increase protective weighting, whose form may be basal regulation, direct coping, psychological defence, or a mixture.
Selection	$A_t = S(O_t, B_t, W_t, \text{local preferability, available possibilities})$.
Recurrence	Realized A_t generates immediate information; outcomes and later consequences add further information to later cycles.

Table 11. Minimal formal restatement.

7.2 Locked integrated propositions

1. The functioning organism continuously registers selected bodily, environmental, activity-related, and consequence information.
2. Perception and broader nonlinguistic inference recurrently organize what is happening, what matters, what can be done, and what may follow.
3. DSWFO is one organism-relative relational orientation, not a collection of independent stores.
4. A present other may be locally differentiated within the world when reciprocal influence is active; the wider world also includes physical conditions, absent persons, possible others, institutions, and learned social regularities. Wider systems enter the operative field only through a specifiable local pathway affecting registration, meaning, capacity or resources, action, or consequences.
5. Future orientation is the prospective continuation of current relational organization, not a separate peer container.
6. Realized activity generates immediate information before distal outcomes. Attempt, realization, agency attribution, outcome, and later consequence remain distinct.
7. Depending on context and weighting, activity and consequence information may contribute to local or broader relational changes. No universal simultaneous field update is assumed.
8. Different relations and dimensions may change in different directions. No common point currency or scalar ledger is postulated.
9. Repeated and differentially weighted updates may alter a diffuse background regulatory condition and, where sentience is warranted independently, a prereflective BSS.
10. Background organization constrains later registration, salience, threat estimation, action readiness, selection, and evidence weighting.
11. Reflective narrative belongs to the same organism but can incompletely access, reinterpret, or diverge from background organization; language can also become new input.
12. Preservation and enrichment are proposed as nested and co-present directions. Survival and security are analytically distinguishable emphases within preservation, not fixed stages or separate modules. Protection is broader than psychological defence, and local preferability is neither identical to nor guaranteed to produce survival, security, or enrichment.

13. Movement toward better phenomenal experience remains A; PED remains F/H.
14. None of these propositions establishes a moral faculty, universal sentience, full innateness, one neural mechanism, or a detailed model of defence, capacity, stuckness, or intervention.

8. Developmental and cross-species scaling

Cross-species continuity must be asserted at the level of bounded components, not by projecting human-scale content downward.

Illustrative organism or stage	Warranted claim	Unwarranted leap
C. elegans	Proprioceptive feedback, locomotor adaptation, and learning support a minimal recurrent organism–environment control loop (Ji et al., 2023; Nuttley, Atkinson-Leadbeater, & Van Der Kooy, 2002).	Narrative self, human-like relation, existential future, or felt BSS.
Dog	Yoked-control evidence suggests more positive affective behavior when dogs solve a problem for reward than when matched rewards arrive without their control (McGowan et al., 2014).	Verbal self-evaluation or proof of the full DSWFO synthesis.
Rhesus monkey	Puzzle manipulation without immediate biological reward supports intrinsically organized activity beyond simple deficit correction (Harlow et al., 1950).	A human concept of meaningful enrichment or a universal PED law.
Newborn / young infant	Body-related multisensory synchrony and early action-sensitive organization support rudimentary differentiation before language.	Adult-like self–other–world separation, reflective agency, or complete innate architecture.
Reflective human	Report, experiment, clinical observation, and autobiographical narrative provide additional access to relational and prospective organization.	Treating report as transparent, complete, or causally primary.

Table 12. Layer-specific cross-species and developmental claims.

The dog result is especially useful because reward receipt was matched: opportunity to control and solve contributed beyond passive receipt. It supports a distinction between activity-related control and outcome alone. It does not show that a dog propositionally concludes “I am capable,” or that the positive affect proves the proposed human-scale background construct.

The cross-species thesis is therefore limited: recurrent feedback, learning, action sensitivity, and control-related organization can occur at different levels of complexity. Identical content, representation, sentience, and meaning are not assumed.

9. Adversarial audit and boundary cases

Case	Model analysis	Constraint imposed
Practice without improvement	Activity can reveal ineffective strategy, high resistance, or current limitation.	Practice cannot be preassigned a positive self-update.

Case	Model analysis	Constraint imposed
Accidental movement	Causal and sensory information may occur without prior intention or endorsement.	Separate realization, intention, agency attribution, and reflective ownership.
Coerced harm	The action occurs under reduced choice; outcome can match freely chosen action while agency integration differs.	Enactment does not prove free preference or character.
Failed attempt	Effort and attempted influence occur without the intended transition.	Attempt information and outcome information must remain separate.
Realized inhibition	Active restraint changes bodily or cognitive organization even though an overt act is absent.	Realized restraint differs from mere omission.
One-off routine	Information may be familiar or low-salience.	Immediate information does not entail durable or global integration.
Verbal promise without action	Language is a real event and input, but the action is not enacted.	Linguistic content and realized activity evidence are not identical.
Caring surgery	Tissue damage occurs within consent, care, skill, and expected restoration.	Surface motor form or pain cannot classify the relational meaning.
Effective resistance	Self-agency may improve while other-related safety worsens.	Mixed relation-specific change must be allowed.
Deliberate retreat	Withdrawal protects a valued possibility under viable choice.	Withdrawal cannot be classified as fear-dominant from form alone.
Powerful aggressor without retaliation	Harm may confirm violation possibility while experienced personal control remains high.	Actor-vulnerability generalization is a separate hypothesis, not a logical necessity.
Pleasurable addiction	Immediate reward can coexist with narrowing control, health, relation, and future options.	Local preferability is not enrichment.
Neurological atypicality or intoxication	Registration, learning, integration, access, or inhibition may differ.	These are later boundary parameters and rule-outs, not ad-hoc explanations here.
Nematode learning	Minimal learning and feedback occur without human narrative.	Use layer-specific terminology and avoid anthropomorphism.

Table 13. Counterexamples used to constrain the model.

The audit yields several mandatory boundaries:

> Behavioral form alone is insufficient. Causal organization, context, alternatives, agency, and consequences matter.
>
> Immediate activity information does not entail a broad, durable, conscious, or uniformly valenced update.
>
> Possibility, probability, current control, personal vulnerability, and total background organization are distinct.
>
> Not every protective operation is psychological defence. Basal viability regulation and direct coping can occur without satisfying the separately tested embodied-objective hypothesis, while an outwardly similar act can reflect mixed organization.
>
> A wider social or institutional condition is not automatically part of the psychological field. Its proposed influence must be traced through a local pathway, and objective constraint must not be redescribed as individual defence.

> One event may support agency and worsen safety at the same time.
>
> A single update is not a persistent pattern and cannot by itself establish psychological stuckness.

10. Falsifiable research program

The framework becomes scientifically useful only if its integrations generate contrasts capable of failing.

Prediction	Discriminating contrast	Target
P1 — Activity versus outcome	With outcome matched, self-produced control should change later agency, capability, or affordance indicators more than passive receipt. With activity matched, later outcomes should add separable information.	Immediate information and bounded recalibration.
P2 — Causal organization versus form	Matched withdrawal under varied coercion, threat, viable alternatives, and deliberate choice should produce different later agency and possibility profiles.	Context-sensitive relational integration.
P3 — Mixed relational update	Effective self-assertion followed by continued hostility should improve self-agency indicators while worsening present-other safety and future-threat indicators more than a one-valence model predicts.	Relation-specific mixed change.
P4 — Local other versus world	A novel event with one agent should initially change estimates of that agent more than generalized estimates; generalization should increase with repetition, similarity, and prior organization.	Present-other localization and learning generalization.
P5 — Prospective continuation	Experimentally altered self–world controllability should change immediate trajectory estimates, which should mediate anticipatory approach, avoidance, or anxiety-related organization.	Future as prospective continuation.
P6 — Accumulation and reversibility	Repeated consistent activity–consequence patterns should produce more durable background change than one event; credible counterevidence should qualify or reverse the pattern.	Background integration.
P7 — Narrative discordance	Explicit approval and immediate pleasure should sometimes coexist with later or indirect indicators of distrust, closure, or narrowed possibility.	BSS–narrative distinction.
P8 — Positive symmetry	Enacting reliable cooperation, protection, or repair should sometimes increase cooperative possibility and openness beyond matched reward receipt.	Content-general relational updating.
P9 — Security corollary	With retaliation, punishment, moral demand, payoff, and motor activity controlled, enacted security violation should leave an action-specific residual in vulnerability or violation-possibility indicators if the corollary is correct.	Security-specific F/H.
P10 — PED beyond immediate reward	Agency, competence, connection, vitality, and future openness should explain durable background improvement beyond reward intensity alone under specified facilitating conditions.	PED operationalization.
P11 — Developmental scaling	Immediate action-sensitive organization should precede adult narrative foresight, while relational specificity and temporal reach should become more articulated with development.	Graded differentiation.
P12 — Cross-domain enactment	Across matched learning, cooperation, avoidance, creation, and deception tasks, enactment should add a bounded update beyond observation, instruction, intention, equivalent motor activity without the relation, and equivalent reward without enactment.	Content-general scope of activity-related updating.

Prediction	Discriminating contrast	Target
P13 — Own social conduct and generalized trust	Enacting deception or exploitation should alter subsequent estimates of others' trustworthiness or cooperation more than observing the same conduct or receiving the same payoff without enacting it; effect size and generalization should remain context-dependent.	Bounded self-to-world social generalization.
P14 — Nonlinguistic organization and later report	Activity-based and prospective changes should sometimes be detectable before verbal report and in nonverbal populations; later report should correlate imperfectly with indirect or prereflective indicators.	Process–access–rendering distinction.
P15 — Threat relative to capacity	Increasing inferred threat while holding estimated capacity low should narrow selection toward protection; restoring credible safety or capacity should increase exploration and flexible engagement without guaranteeing optimal choice.	Inherited threat–capacity weighting.

Table 14. Discriminating predictions.

Repeated null results under adequately powered, valid operationalizations must count against the corresponding hypothesis. Failure of activity-versus-outcome and cross-domain enactment contrasts would weaken bounded generalization beyond the established sensorimotor stream. Failure of local-other, social-generalization, and mixed-update contrasts would weaken the relational topology. Failure of accumulation and reversibility would weaken the proposed route to BSS. Failure of prereport or nonverbal effects would narrow claims about language-independent organization. Failure of threat–capacity contrasts would weaken that inherited weighting formulation. Failure of enrichment-related measures to add explanatory value beyond reward would weaken PED, not the A-level axiom.

10.1 Measurement requirements

- Measure possibility, probability, controllability, personal vulnerability, and anticipated trajectory separately.
- Measure self-related, present-other, wider-world, and prospective indicators separately before testing their integration.
- Treat background organization as a multidimensional profile, not one valence score.
- Assess reflective narrative separately from prereflective, behavioral, physiological, or indirect indicators.
- Use repeated and longitudinal designs to distinguish provisional change from durable organization.
- Pre-specify moderators such as coercion, alternatives, salience, attribution, repetition, and prior threat rather than adding them only after results are known.
- Do not treat any one proxy as BSS itself.

11. Evidence and adoption matrix

Claim	Class	Inferential distance	Version 2.2 decision
Recurrent embodied inference–activity loop	E1/E2	Direct components, integrative architecture	Retain.

Claim	Class	Inferential distance	Version 2.2 decision
Bounded component operations without online language	E1/E2	Direct across several domains	Retain; no blanket innateness inference.
Dynamic organism-relative and prospective estimation	E1/E2	Direct and convergent components	Retain.
Unified DSWFO construct	F	Integrative synthesis	Retain with relational definition.
Present other as local differentiation within world	F/H	Architecture and learning-generalization hypothesis	Adopt and test.
Future as prospective continuation	F/H	Component support, exact dependence untested	Adopt and test.
Immediate activity-related information	E1	Direct sensorimotor/action evidence	Retain as bounded established component.
Bounded action-based recalibration	E1/E2	Direct in selected tasks and domains	Retain with scope limits.
Context and coercion alter agency integration	E1	Experimental contrasts	Retain as moderator evidence.
Broader relational-field updating	F/H	Integration requiring direct cross-domain tests	Adopt as testable hypothesis.
Every activity updates all relations	Rejected	Stronger than evidence	Explicitly reject.
Mixed relation-specific contributions	F/H	Compatible with component evidence; exact formulation untested	Adopt and test.
Diffuse affective and integrative background states	E1/E2	Neighbouring constructs	Retain as foundation.
Exact BSS synthesis and formation through repeated updates	F/H	Integrative construct	Retain, operationalize, test.
Viability-directed regulation	E1/E2	Direct and convergent	Retain.
Exploration, competence, play, and intrinsically organized activity	E1/E2	Plural bounded literatures	Retain without collapsing them into one mechanism.
Exact PED synthesis	F/H	Integrative and nonuniversal	Retain as framework direction and research proposal.
Movement toward better phenomenal experience	A	Not evidential	Retain explicitly as axiom.
Security violation produces actor-vulnerability update	F/H	Content-specific, adjacent evidence only	Retain only as a separable corollary.
Survival–security–enrichment articulation and three protective forms	F/H	Architecture-level refinement with component support; exact mapping remains untested	Adopt as bounded terminology; do not treat as modules, stages, or a settled taxonomy.

Table 15. Scientific status and adoption decisions.

12. Continuity and integration audit

12.1 Traceability from the previous supplement

Previous element	Version 2.2 destination	Disposition
Automatic recurrent architecture inherited from mother	Sections 1 and 7	Retained and aligned to mother Version 2.2.
DSWFO	Section 3	Retained; independent-domain wording replaced by one relational organization.
“Three domains”	Sections 3.2–3.3	Corrected to analytic foci and directional relations.
Universal four-domain realized-action hypothesis	Sections 4.4–4.6 and Table 15	Rejected as too strong; replaced by local, mixed, context-sensitive relational-field F/H.
Immediate action information before outcome	Sections 4.1–4.3	Retained as bounded E1/E2 component and distinguished from outcome.
Action content examples	Section 4.10	Retained as separately evidenced applications.
Security violation corollary	Section 4.10 and Prediction P9	Retained only as content-specific F/H.
BSS	Section 5	Retained; functional and phenomenal terminology separated; recurrence made explicit.
BSS–narrative discordance	Section 5.4	Retained with a prohibition on individual inference from one act.
PED	Section 6	Retained as F/H and separated from local preferability.
Better phenomenal experience	Section 6.1	Retained as A and limited by independent sentience warrant.
Threat relative to capacity	Section 6.5	Retained minimally; detailed capacity deferred.
Nonlinguistic base operation	Sections 1.3–1.4	Retained; blanket innateness rejected.
Nonhuman applicability	Section 8	Retained at component-specific levels without anthropomorphism.
Predictive-processing comparison	Section 2.4	Retained as comparison only.
Adversarial audit	Section 9	Expanded with realized restraint, local-other, and mixed-update cases.
Research program	Section 10	Rewritten to test the relational formulation.
Decimal scientific scores	Section 2.2	Retired because they imply false measurement precision.
Instructions for rewriting mother v1.4	Section 12.2	Replaced by a completed integration audit against mother Version 2.2.
Stuckness and intervention deferral	Sections 1.6 and 13	Retained despite existence of separate downstream documents.

Table 16. No-loss map from the previous supplement to Version 2.2.

12.2 Alignment with the foundational architecture

Mother Version 2.2 proposition	Deep v2.0 elaboration	Result
P1–P3: registration, constructive perception, broader nonlinguistic inference	Sections 1.3, 4.1–4.3, and 7	Consistent; no new component is promoted beyond evidence.
P4: DSWFO	Section 3	Exact relational and developmental elaboration.
P5: background regulatory integration	Section 5	Exact functional–phenomenal distinction and recurrence.
P6: bodily regulation and action readiness	Sections 4.2 and 4.7	Preserved as input/moderator; detailed emotion and body mechanisms deferred.
P7: immediate action information and distal consequences	Section 4	Exact process elaboration; four-domain ambiguity removed.
P8–P11: recurrence, limited capacity, selection, local preferability	Sections 6.4–6.5 and 7	Preserved without extending capacity or selection theory.
P12: axiom of better phenomenal experience	Section 6.1	Preserved as A only.
P13: PED	Section 6	Elaborated with falsification safeguards and the nested survival–security–enrichment articulation.
P14: threat relative to capacity	Section 6.5	Preserved with the boundary between general protection and psychological defence made explicit.
P15: coexistence and changing relative influence	Sections 4.6 and 6.3–6.5	Elaborated through dominance and mixed causal organization.

Table 17. Two-way consistency audit against the canonical mother document.

12.3 Adoption of the continuous-flow clarification

Version 2.2 retains every architecture-relevant correction from Continuous Inferential Flow in the Psychological System:

- event includes external occurrence, bodily change, another organism's activity, own overt activity, and realized bounded covert activity;
- immediate activity information is separated from achieved outcome and later consequence;
- the present other is local within the world field, while the wider world includes absent and future others as well as physical and social structure;
- future is prospective continuation, not an independent store;
- self → self, reciprocal present-other relations, self → world, world → self, and present other → world are analytic relations, not separate modules;
- activity can inform the acting organism and other organisms;
- overt activity, realized covert operation, unexecuted intention, realized restraint, and mere omission are distinguished;
- coercion, emotion, alternatives, and agency attribution can alter integration;
- directional contribution replaces literal point language;
- mixed relation-specific change is allowed without a single net score;

- background organization both results from and constrains recurrent processing;
- developmental organization is graded rather than completely fused or adult-like at birth; and
- cross-species claims are limited to layers supported by evidence.

No Continuous Flow conclusion requires importing detailed defence, capacity, stuckness, or intervention into this document. Version 2.2 incorporates only the later defence statement's category boundary and bounded-field clarification; the target, mechanisms, taxonomy, and tests remain in that dedicated statement.

12.4 Omission audit

The following are not accidental omissions. They are locked deferrals with an explicit downstream destination:

Deferred domain	Why absent here	Required later work
Emotion and bodily symptom process	The current document only needs bodily and affective change as condition, readiness, and information.	Specify emotion generation, bodily expression or release, impulse, and regulation without disrupting the recurrent architecture.
Capacity	Only minimal demand-relative estimated ability is needed here.	Define skill, competence, resources, flexibility, and tolerance of bodily symptoms in its own document.
Defence	Boundary distinctions are recognized, but the detailed target, activation sequence, and operations remain outside this document.	Use Foundational Architecture of Psychological Defence, Version 1.5; keep named-operation taxonomy separate.
Psychological stuckness	One update is not a persistent constrained pattern.	Use the separate stuckness architecture and audit its references to DSWFO/BSS/PED.
Intervention	Mechanism and target criteria remain incomplete.	Build only after capacity, emotion/body, defence, and stuckness relations are sufficiently specified across their dedicated documents.
Neural and substance-related variation	This is a functional architecture.	Treat as later implementation, boundary, and rule-out work.

Table 18. Explicit deferrals preventing silent scope expansion.

13. Locked scientific statement

The psychological system is provisionally modelled as a recurrent embodied organism–environment process whose bounded online operations need not require language. Prior organization, bodily condition, environmental information, learned regularities, and current events constrain perception, broader inference, bodily regulation, action readiness, and selection. Realized activity generates immediate information before distal outcomes; bodily, environmental, and social consequences add further information.

The framework proposes that these inputs can alter one organism-relative relational orientation. This orientation concerns the organism's condition and agency, its reciprocal relation with a present other, the

wider physical and social world's affordances and constraints, and possible next trajectories. A present other is a local differentiation within the world field. Future orientation is the prospective continuation of the current relational configuration. Neither is an independent store.

The direction and scope of an update cannot be read from outward behavior alone. They depend on causal organization, context, prior weighting, alternatives, agency attribution, and consequences. One event can support self-agency while worsening present-other safety or prospective threat. Contributions need not be conscious, verbal, arithmetically combined, or durably integrated. Immediate information is established more strongly than broad relational updating.

Repeated and differentially weighted updates may alter a diffuse background regulatory condition and, where sentience is independently warranted, a prereflective background self-state. This background organization can diverge from reflective narrative and also constrain later cycles. The exact multidimensional synthesis remains F/H.

Preservation and enrichment are proposed as nested, co-present directions. Survival most directly concerns viability and continued life; security concerns inhabitable embodied engagement; enrichment expands its viable quality and meaningful range. These are nested emphases rather than modules or stages; the protective distinctions are nonexclusive and cross-cutting. Psychological defence may support security while opposing survival or enrichment. Local preferability can diverge from all three. Movement toward better phenomenal experience is retained transparently as A, while PED and this articulation remain F/H.

> **LOCKED CONCLUSION** Version 2.2 preserves every valid commitment of Version 2.0 while adding an embodied definition of “psychological,” a bounded multiscale field criterion, and a non-collapsing survival–security–enrichment articulation. Direct and convergent evidence supports the bounded components; DSWFO, broad relational integration, BSS, PED, and the new integrations remain visible F/H where not directly established. No claim is made that the complete architecture is innate, one biological mechanism, a moral faculty, a sentience criterion, or a finished theory of capacity, emotion, defence, stuckness, or intervention.

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